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Abstract: Phishing has evolved to a serious cause of risk in our daily contact with the World Wide 
Web. Therefore, different extensions and plugins for web browsers were developed to detect 
phishing websites. To furthermore minimize the risk of falling for a phishing attack, the users 
themselves have to be educated. Therefore, the online game “NoPhish” has been developed, which 
explains the basics of phishing attacks and how to detect them efficiently. In the following study, 
the success rate of this online tool was measured. The goal was to determine which phishing 
strategies are effective in fooling users, which strategies can be practised well and which strategies 
are still effective in fooling users after having been taught by some educational material. The 
effectiveness of “NoPhish” in increasing users’ security awareness and the ability of detecting 
phishing URLs could be proven. Furthermore, it could be determined which types of phishing should 
be drawn special attention to in future development of phishing education material. 
Keywords: Usable security, security awareness, phishing education 
1 Introduction 
Phishing represents an attempt from so-called phishers to elicit confidential information 
of users by using faked websites. These phishers want to get access to private account 
information and passwords which are used for e.g. e-banking, social networks or online 
shops. A successful phishing attack can have disastrous consequences for the victims 
leading to financial losses and identity theft. Usually these phishers send fraudulent e-
mails or chat messages with a link and the order to click on it. There is a multitude of 
different phishing attacks like spear phishing where phishers want to increase their success 
rate by sending e-mails to specific companies with individual matched content. Another 
type of phishing is called clone phishing where phishers clone a previously sent message 
and replace the legit content with malicious information like links or formulas. That 
phishing plays a major role in our daily life shows the statistic of the Anti-Phishing 
Working Group (APWG), identifying around 50,000 new phishing websites every month, 
with retail being the most targeted industry sector at the moment and payment services 
close behind, but also in other sectors such as social networking. More and more 
companies fear that users will lose confidence in electronic commerce. Therefore, an 
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efficient protection against phishing is needed. 
Ludl, McAllister, Kirda and Kruegel (2007) engage in the effectiveness of techniques to 
detect phishing sites in their research. Their results show a 90% rate of detection of 
phishing attempts of blacklist-based solutions. The method identifies phishing sites after 
they are launched and reported as suspicious. These solutions represent an efficient way 
of discovery. However, their research covers only extensions and plugins for web 
browsers. But to furthermore minimize the risk, the users themselves have to be educated. 
Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst (2006) studied which phishing attacks succeed in fooling users 
and why. They tested 9 different types of phishing attacks like different types of spoofing 
or different types of requested information. 22 participants were shown 20 web sites and 
asked afterwards to determine which ones were fraudulent. Additionally, the users had to 
evaluate their confidence about their decisions. Generally, the users were quite confident 
about their answers. However, 7 participants had never heard of phishing before they 
participated the study. Furthermore, 13 participants never paid attention to “HTTPS” and 
further 5 participants mentioned that they even never take a look at the address bar at all. 
To sum up, the results of the study lead to the conclusion that educating users about 
phishing has to be taken very seriously. These alarmingly high values show even more the 
importance of user education such as in the research of Sheng, Magnien, Kumaraguru, 
Acquisti, Cranor, Hong and Nunge (2007) with their online-game „Anti-Phishing Phil“. 
Their results demonstrate that games represent a highly efficient way of information 
transfer. Using a story-based approach with a phish character guiding through the game 
they provided a challenging, contextual and interactive game experience. Their results 
show the improved skills of the game users in detecting phishing-URLs compared to 
groups, which were not allowed to use the interactive game but instead read existing 
training material or had been tutored. 
Canova, Volkamer, Bergmann and Reinheimer (2014) had a similar approach for 
educating users by an interactive game. They developed the Android app “NoPhish” which 
tutores the users in detecting phishing-URLs. Due to the fact that people are not regularly 
confronted with phishing attacks, the authors analysed its effectiveness on users’ 
knowledge retention. The results of their studies show that users of this app are more 
successful in detecting phishing-URLs, particular over a longer period. 
Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor and Downs (2010) study the effectiveness of 
different educational materials to identify phishing webpages in their research. 
Participants of their study had to complete a role play to measure their susceptibility to 
fall for phishing attacks. On the basis of these results the participants were assigned to four 
different experimental groups with different educational material: a PhishGuru cartoon, 
Anti-Phishing Phil, popular web-based training materials and a combination of Anti-
Phishing Phil plus a PhishGuru cartoon. The results of the authors’ study show that 
educational material reduces the end-users’ risk of supplying private information on 
phishing webpages by 40%. 
A further work of Kumaraguru, Rhee, Acquisti, Cranor, Hong and Nunge (2007) is about 
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the comparison of three methods for improving the users’ skills of detecting phishing 
attacks – two embedded training designs and another method consisting of simple email 
security notices. The embedded training methods consist of regularly sent phishing emails. 
If a user does not assess the mail as a phishing attack and clicks on a link, the user receives 
a warning. The first method presents information using text and graphics, the second 
method uses a comic strip format. The results of the authors’ study demonstrate that the 
number of identified phishing emails decreased using the embedded training designs. The 
authors found out that the comic strip intervention was most effective while security 
notices were rather ineffective in teaching people about phishing attacks. 
In the present study, the challenging and interactive web application of “NoPhish” was 
developed (based on Volkamer’s “NoPhish” Android app) to educate users and increase 
their awareness and ability in detecting phishing URLs. The recruited participants had to 
do a pretest for checking their ability in detecting phishing attacks. Afterwards they ran 
through a training phase where they learnt the basic attacks of phishing and in a final step 
they had to test their learnt knowledge in a concluding posttest. The goal of the present 
study is to investigate 7 different types of phishing, more precisely to analyse which of 
them are effective. Another interesting fact is, which attacks can be practised well so that 
after some training time there is a high success rate in detecting phishing attacks. The last 
aspect is to investigate which phishing strategies are still effective in fooling users after 
they were educated by teaching materials. 
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from December 2015 until January 2016 via social networking 
sites like Facebook and via sending personal messages to circles of acquaintances. 65 users 
registered at the web application but 9 of them answered neither pretest nor posttest and 
18 of them did not answer the posttest. Finally, 32 of 65 participants were left for analysing 
their data. The behaviour of 14 female participants and 18 male participants aged between 
19 and 56 (M = 28.54, SD = 10.79) was analysed. They got no reward for participating 
the study. There were no special selection criteria or limitations to participate the study 
and the participants were not told about the purpose of the study.  
2.2 Stimuli 
The users were presented a total of 68 different stimuli, 28 items of the pretest and 40 
stimuli of the education part. The same 28 items of the pretest were also presented in the 
posttest. The stimuli design and selection happened by the investigators. The stimuli were 
images of websites with corresponding web addresses of different types of phishing. 
Knowledge of the structure of web addresses could help identify phishing messages 
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(shown in Figure 1). The domain, the here called „who-section” (Wer-Bereich) is the most 
important part for detecting phishing URLs. 
 
Fig. 1: Structure of a web address in “NoPhish” 
 
In the study the following 7 types of phishing attacks were investigated: 
• phishing type 1: URLs based on IP addresses (e.g. https://87.122.24.91/ws) 
• phishing type 2: URLs where the who-section doesn’t contain the company name 
(e.g. https://www.hfkjt.com) 
• phishing type 3: URLs which contain the company name at the place of the 
department (Abteilung) (e.g. https://www.instagram.account.com) 
• phishing type 4: URLs which contain the company name at the place of the topic of 
conversation (Gesprächsthema) (e.g. https://www.account.com/t-
online.de/settings) 
• phishing type 5: URLs where the who-section seems similar to the real URL but use 
an additional term (e.g. https://www.bahn-support.de) 
• phishing type 6: URLs which contain typos (https://www.facebok.com) 
• phishing type 7: URLs which contain similar looking letters and numbers like the 
real ones (e.g. https://www.clropbox.com). 
 
The pretest has 14 faked items (2 items per phishing type) and 14 legitimate items. The 
same 28 items of the pretest are used for the posttest afterwards. The education part covers 
8 different levels. Level 1 imparts knowledge of fundamental concepts to detect phishing 
attacks. Therefore, Level 1 doesn’t contain any specific phishing addresses. Level 2 to 
Level 8 cover the above-named phishing types (1) to (7). Thereby each level highlights 
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one specific type of phishing, each with 6 corresponding URLs. The education part used 
only URLs without images of webpages. Every user got the same URLs in the same order. 
2.3 Procedure  
The experiment took about 45 minutes per person and was performed in 4 phases: (1) 
registration and personal data, (2) pretest, (3) education phase and (4) posttest. 
Phase 1 – Registration and personal data. A first introduction about the experiment was 
shown to the participants on the welcome page of the web application. Furthermore, a 
definition of phishing and the following steps of the task were given. At first a pretest had 
to be done to classify the knowledge of every user, afterwards several levels to develop or 
strengthen the knowledge about phishing and finally a posttest for testing the learned 
skills. Furthermore, there were buttons to register or to login after a break. By clicking on 
the register-button the participant had to submit personal data like login credentials (e-
mail-address and password), year of birth and gender. To provide a realistic experience 
the participants had to choose their frequently-used internet browser (Apple Safari, Google 
Chrome, Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox). According to the user’s choice the images 
and address bars were personalised. In Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer and Google 
Chrome the important part of the web address is highlighted. This is not the case in Apple 
Safari. After submitting their data, the participants got to the pretest. 
Phase 2 – Pretest. At the pretest every user was presented 28 images of a webpage with 
corresponding URLs. The participant’s task was to identify if the shown webpage is a legit 
webpage or a phishing attack. Afterwards they had to state their confidence in their 
evaluation (on a scale of “very unsure”, “unsure”, “medium”, “sure”, “very sure”). After 
finishing the pretest the result was shown to the user (how many right answers they got). 
Phase 3 – Education phase. After the pretest the training phase started. The participant 
got to an overview page of all levels, starting with a short introduction to the topic. After 
finishing the introduction, the task was to complete all levels. All levels are built up in the 
same way and cover one specific type of phishing. Every level consists of two parts, a 
theoretical part and a following practical task. The theoretical part explains the current 
phishing attack and how to detect it. After finishing the theoretical part, the user had to 
use his new learned skills in the practical task. An URL was presented and the participant 
had to identify if the URL is legit or not. After submitting the decision, the result was 
shown to the user. If it was a phishing URL, the following task was to highlight the who-
section. Level 1 starts with the basics of a web address, the here called “who-section”, the 
domain. Level 2 to Level 8 cover the different phishing attacks 1 – 7. At the beginning of 
every level the user got an overview of the so far learned phishing attacks. After finishing 
the practical task, the participants were shown how many questions they answered right 
and the following level was unlocked. The finished level was now locked so that the 
participants didn’t have another chance to answer the questions again to get better results. 
After completing all levels there was an additional part, the concluding remarks which 
gave a short summary about phishing tricks which were not given attention to in the levels 
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of the web application. 
Phase 4 – Posttest. After completing the education phase the participant finally had to 
pass the posttest. The proceeding was analogue to that in the pretest, as well the 28 items. 
Having finished the posttest, the participant was shown the performance for a last time.  
3 Results  
The data was analysed to determine if there are any differences in the test scores between 
the two times of pretest and posttest caused by the treatment. Because there are two times 
of measurements, multivariate techniques were used which allow multiple dependent 
variables. A within-subject multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was done with 
7 independent variables and 2 dependent variables. Pretest and posttest score were 
measured as dependent variables and phishing types 1 – 7 were measured as independent 
variables. Comparing the test score means in Figure 2, phishing type 5 and 6 got the worst 
results in the pretest and also in the posttest but with the fact that phishing type 6 
documents a major increase than phishing type 5. 
 
Fig. 2: Test score means of pretest (grey) and posttest (black), split up in the 7 types of phishing 
Phishing type 7 reached the highest result in the pretest while phishing type 2 got the 
highest result in the posttest closely followed by phishing types 1 and 7. A total mean of 
all pretest scores was reached by a value of .74 (only test scores in a range between 0 and 
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1 are possible) and a total mean of all posttest scores was reached by a value of .93. Within 
the MANOVA the 4 following multivariate tests were done: (1) Wilks's lambda 
distribution, (2) Pillai's Trace Test, (3) the Lawley-Hotelling trace and (4) Roy's largest 
root. All of the 4 tests are based on the two matrices of “sum of squares” and “cross 
product”. The 4 tests got significant with F(7, 56) = 3.47 and p = .0037 on a 99% level of 
significance. Conducting a series of follow-up ANOVAs of the dependent variables, split 
up in the 7 categories of phishing attacks, the values showed 6 of 7 significant results 
(Table 1). All of the results were significant except from phishing type 7. 
phishing type p-value significance 
1 .042 significant 
2 .0071 significant 
3 .000027 significant 
4 .0029 significant 
5 .0055 significant 
6 .012 significant 
7 .25 not significant 
 
Tab. 1: Results of significance of ANOVAs 
Following the principal analysis, a Welch two sample t-test was performed for testing the 
mean scores of pretest and posttest (of the particular phishing types) for significance. All 
tests were done on a 95% level of significance. 
phishing type p-value significance pretest score posttest score 
1 .04 significant .88 .98 
2 .009 significant .88 1 
3 .00005 significant .70 .97 
4 .003 significant .66 .92 
5 .006 significant .50 .78 
6 .01 significant .62 .86 
7 .30 not significant .94 .98 
 
Tab. 2: Results of Welch two sample t-test 
In summary, 6 significant results were found (phishing types 1 – 6) and 1 non-significant 
result (phishing type 7). Furthermore, the correlations between the dependent variables 
were investigated, split up in the 7 categories of phishing attacks. The lowest correlation 
was shown between type 1 and type 6 with r = .017 and between type 1 and type 7 with r 
= .034. On the other hand, the highest correlation was shown between type 2 and type 3 
with r = .66, between type 3 and type 4 with r = .65 and between type 4 and type 5 with r 
= .52. In general, only positive correlations appeared, varying around a mean of r = .42. 
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4 Discussion 
The task of this research was to determine the efficiency of the online tool developed 
before. The question is whether the measurements of the test scores change over time. 
Non-constant measurements of the test scores would indicate influence of the training 
material. A MANOVA analysis of the data showed that there is a significant difference 
between the multivariate measurements of test scores at the 99% level of significance. 
Looking at the differences of individual measurements between the different types of 
phishing, type 1 – 6 got significant and type 7 got not significant. An overall analysis of 
combined pretest and posttest scores of each phishing attack showed that phishing types 
1, 2 and 7 were the most often correctly detected attacks. Phishing types 5 and 6 were the 
phishing attacks where the most mistakes were done. Comparing the test score means, 
phishing types 5 and 6 got the worst results in the pretest and posttest but with the fact that 
phishing type 6 documents a major increase in the posttest than phishing type 5. Phishing 
type 7 reached the highest result in the pretest while phishing type 2 got the highest result 
in the posttest closely followed by phishing types 1 and 7. 
The above listed results show significantly changes in the different test scores which 
indicate influence of the training material. Posttest scores and the results of the belonging 
t-tests proof that users make significantly less mistakes when they have to decide whether 
a website is faked or not than before using the online tool. Furthermore, it was the goal to 
analyse which phishing strategies are effective in fooling users and which are still effective 
after educating users with teaching material. Results show that especially phishing types 
5 (URLs where the who-section seems similar to the real URL but use an additional term 
e.g. https://www.bahn-support.de) and 6 (URLs which contain typos 
https://www.facebok.com) were difficult to identify as phishing attacks. Regarding the 
collected data in total, the participants performed worst at phishing types 5 and 6, even in 
the posttest. This indicates that theses types have to be considered seriously because they 
present the weakest points in users’ attention. With regard to the research of Dhamija et. 
al (2006), nearly the same outcomes for phishing type 5 were found. About half of the 
presented URLs could not be identified as phishing attempts. A possible explanation for 
the bad performance regarding type 5 could be that users do not really know the exact 
URLs of their visited websites because they probably do not pay much attention to the 
important parts like the address bar, demonstrated in the study of Dhamija et. al (2006). A 
possible explanation for the bad performance at type 6 could be that URLs with typos look 
too similar to the real ones so that detecting the difference is rather unlikely by only having 
a short look at the URL. So, in future development of phishing education material special 
attention has to be drawn to these types of phishing. On the other hand, the posttest score 
means show high detecting results in phishing attacks 1, 2 and 7 which indicates that these 
types can be practised very well. Due to the fact that phishing type 7 got not significant in 
the univariate analysis and the t-test, it can be argued that type 7 (URLs which contain 
similar looking letters and numbers like the real ones e.g. https://www.clropbox.com) has 
a high success rate in detecting phishing URLs but additional training has no effect on the 
result. Because of the high scores in the pretest and also in the posttest, there is evidence 
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that this phishing attack is easy to discover and that this one is no effective technique to 
fool users. For now, there is no explanation why people are able to detect URLs with 
similar looking letters but on the other hand are not able to detect typos effectively. 
Interestingly, the study of Dhamija et. al (2006) shows completely opposed results in 
detecting phishing URLs with similar looking letters. With a success rate of about 9%, 
their results are in high contrast to this research with a success rate of about 94%. A 
possible explanation could be the different presentations of the URLs and corresponding 
websites. In this research only static images of websites were used, where Dhamija et. al 
(2006) presented websites with full functionality. This functionality, which made it 
possible for the participants to explore the website, its corresponding subpages and 
especially the changing might have influenced the participants’ focus with regard to the 
important part (the address bar) for detecting phishing URLs. So, in summary only 
phishing types 1 and 2 can be practised well for detecting phishing URLs. The goal of this 
online tool is to educate users’ security awareness and ability in detecting phishing URLs. 
Based on the total pretest score mean of all questions with .74 and posttest score mean of 
.93 a significant improvement can be proven. According to the research of Sheng et. al 
(2007) it could be confirmed that games represent a highly efficient way of information 
transfer. 
A fact that also has to be mentioned is the decrease of participating users. 65 users signed 
up at our online tool but only 32 of them performed the training and the tests until the end. 
A possible explanation for this huge decrease is probably that people only deal with 
something when they are really interested in or when they are forced to. Due to the fact 
that one run through the tool including pretest, training phase and posttest took about 45 
minutes probably a lot of a participants quit the game because they did not want to put so 
much time in it and unfortunately neither in further education. Another aspect which has 
to be considered are the correlations between different types of phishing. There were 
strong correlations between phishing types 2 and 3, 3 and 4, 4 and 5 which indicates that 
these types of phishing could influence each other, so that maybe people could be able to 
identify phishing URLs without the need of additional different training material. 
Due to the fact that people are not regularly confronted with phishing attacks, Canova et. 
al (2014) analysed the effectiveness on users’ knowledge retention. The results of their 
studies show that users of the “NoPhish” Android app are more successful in detecting 
phishing-URLs, particular over a longer period. Another interesting aspect for further 
research could be analysing the tool’s effectiveness on user’s knowledge retention in 
particular for every of the above named types of phishing. For future work, it could be 
also interesting to what extent the conceptual design turns out to be suitable for different 
types of user groups. Within the study, only the age of the participants was collected. 
Improved results in the posttest could be found in the age group between 50 and 60 (5 
usable results) like in the age group between 20 and 40 (27 usable results). Due to 
insufficient available data, there cannot be provided any information regarding how far 
the training presents an adequate method for specific age groups. 
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An aspect of this study which wasn’t considered are the different types of internet 
browsers. According to the user’s choice the images and address bars were personalised. 
In Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer and Google Chrome the important part of the web 
address is highlighted. This is not the case in Apple Safari. It was not considered which 
consequence the user’s choice had. By using Apple Safari, the important part is not 
highlighted therefore identifying the who-section was an additional challenge for these 
users. These difficulties could have influenced the results and could have produced more 
low values in the graphics. For further research, this has to be taken into account and 
possibly researched in an additional study. Another aspect, which was not considered, was 
the existing knowledge of the users. Beforehand, the participants were not asked about 
their knowledge of phishing. Due to this fact, test scores could have turned out better than 
they really are. For now, it is not possible to act on the assumption that some kind of 
phishing attacks is easy to detect because the high results could be also explained by the 
users’ knowledge. But the most important point, regarding the alarmingly high statistics 
of APWG, is still minimizing the risk of falling for phishing attacks. Therefore, the users 
themselves have to be educated. The goal of this web application was to increase users’ 
security awareness and the ability of detecting phishing URLs. This could be significantly 
achieved. 
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